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IN THE SUPRF.ME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

CASE NO. 16610

BETTY J. BLACK, individually
and as personal representative
of the estate of Don J. Black,
and DON J. BLACK REALTY, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Many of the statements contained in the Brief of
Appellant and the Brief of Defendants-Respondent as to the fact
in this case are undisputed; however, a careful examination of'
affidavits which are the source of the facts in this case revea
that in several respects defendant's Statement of the Facts is
inaccurate.
The most serious misstatement of the facts contained'.
defendants'

Brief arises in the context of defendants' insister

that the only agreement between the parties relating to partia
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1

that Utah Mortgage was free to release or to not release, as it
saw fit.

(See Brief of Defendants-Respondent, pp. 3-5, 17-18.J
There are four references to partial releases in the

Record.

The first of these is contained in the Trust Deed itself

in paragraph B.4. which states that upon request of Utah Mortgage
the trustee may "reconvey without warranty all or any part of said
property."

(R. 17.)

The remaining references to the agreement are found in
the Anderson, Fry and Newman affidavits (R. 25, 29 and 30.)

Mr.

Anderson's affidavit sets forth the following information as to
the loan agreement:
6.
At the time it made the loan Utah Mortgage
agreed with the Blacks and Black Realty that it
would give a partial release as to individual lots
in the proposed subdivision upon payment of
$5,200.00 per lot.
This release price represented
approximately 115% of the prorata value of each
lot based upon the loan amount.
The release price
was later raised to $5,500.00.
(R. 26.)
Correspondingly, the affidavit of John D. Fry states:
2.
As part of the loan, Mr. and Mrs. Black
requested that Utah Mortgage agree to release
single lots from the Trust Deed upon payment of
the sum of $5,200.00. This, Utah Mortgage agreed
to do.
(R. 29.J
Finally, the affidavit of Robert A. Newman provides the following
information as to the lot release agreement:
2.
Although the facts surrounding the release of
lots varied with each sale, typically a buyer
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wisning to purchase one of tne Brook Hollow lots
would pay the lot release price into escrow with a
title insurance company as part of his closing.
His title insurance company would then forward the
$5,200.00 or $5,500.00 release price to us.
Upon
receipt of the release price, we instructed the
trustee under tne Trust Deea to execute a partial
reconveyance as to the particular lot.
All of the
Black lots were released in this manner.
(R. 30.)
It is clear from the above statements from the affida':.
of Messrs. Anderson, Fry and Newman that quite apart from the
language in the Trust Deed which permitted Utah Mortgage to mal.•
partial reconveyances of the property, there existed a separatE
agreement between the parties which required Utah Mortgage to
release inaividual lots in the suodivision upon payment of
$5,200.00 and tnat this lot release price was subsequently raiE

by agreement of the parties to $5,500.00.

Thus, Mr. Anderson':

Affiaavit makes reference to the fact that "Utah Mortgage agw
with the Blacks and Black Realty tnat it would give a partial
release as to individual lots in the proposed subdivision upon
payment of $5,200.00 per lot."

(R.

26.)

And Mr. Fry states tt

the Blacks "requested that Utah Mortgage agree to release sing!
lots from the Trust Deed upon payment of the sum of $5,200.00
" and that Utah Mortgage agreed to do so.

(R. 29.)

Notwithstanding the clear language of the affidavits'
set forth above, defendants characterize Utah Mortgage as bein;
"free to set any release price it chose", and to "have withhelc

-3-
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even nigher release price, had it so desired".
Defendants-Respondent, p. 4.)

(Brief of

Similarly, defendants state that

"Utah Mortgage's right to demand any payment it chose as a
condition of releasing lots was unrestricted

." and that "[i)t

could and did vary the release price to suit its perception of
necessary cash flow."

(Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 5.)

A more accurate statement of the facts as set forth in
the affidavits would appear to be that an agreement of some type
existed between the parties as to partial releases of the lots,
that the agreement, although not set forth in detail in the
record, required that Utah Mortgage release lots to the defendants
upon their tender of an agreed-upon sum, and that at some point in
time, for unknown reasons, the release price was increased from
$5,200.00 to $5,500.00.
A second misstatement of the facts occurs in defendants'
Statement as to the sufficiency of the release price to pay off
the outstanding indebtedness under the note.
state that "[a]

Thus, defendants

release price of even $5,200.00 per lot would have

been more than sufficient to retire the loan, had it been
collected."

(Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 5.)

It should be

noted that this statement is not taken from the facts as set forth
in any of the affidavits, but rather is an interpolation of
certain figures found in the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson.

-4-
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Mr. Anderson states in his Aff1oavit that Utah Mortgage

loan~

defendants the sum of $675,715.00, or 75% of the appraised val,
of the land and that the release price of $5,200.00 represente·
"approximately 115% of the prorata value of each lot".
26.)

Defendants apparently conclude from these figures

(R. 21,
that~

each lot been released for the $5,200.00 or $5,500.00 release
pr ice, the loan would have been paid well before all of the lot
had been released.

Such a conclusion overlooks the fact thatt

loan oalance could have been increased by subsequent advances,
payment of which would still be secured by the Trust Deed.

(~

the third paragraph of the Trust Deed which states that the
instrument is given to secure not only payment of the principa:
and interest due on to the note, but to secure payment of all

i

expended by the beneficiary or trustee pursuant to their right'
under the Trust Deed.

(R.

16.))

That such advances were made

apparent from the following statement by Mr. Anderson in h~
affidavit:
7.
Because of various cost overruns, delays, and
unforseen expenses, the amount required to
complete the project and the corresponding funds
dispursed from loan account, exceeded the fair
market value of the lots comprising the proJect.
As a result, the proceeds from the sale of the
property described in the Trust Deed were not
sufficient to pay off the loan.
(R. 26.)
While admittedly the affidavits contain little
information as to the reason why the sums paid for the lot

-s-
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releases were insufficient to pay off the loan balance,! it is
inaccurate to say, as defendants do, that "a release price of even
$5,200.00 per lot would have been more than sufficient to retire
the loan.

The more accurate statement would appear to be

that if no further advances were made to the defendants, the
cumulative lot release price would have been sufficient.
Defendants' misapprehension of the above facts leads to a
third misstatement: namely, that "Utah Mortgage apparently claims
that it somehow lost track of the loan balance and released all
the mortgaged lots before the loan had been paid off."
Defendants-Respondent, p. 6.)

(Brief of

The facts as set forth in the

affidavits are quite the contrary.

Far from alleging that they

lost tracK of the loan balance and inadvertantly released all of
the remaining lots, the representatives of Utah Mortgage stated

1
These and other gaps in the facts set forth in the
affidavits are understandable when one considers that the action
was commencea only a few weeks prior to defendants' motion.
Furthermore, neither defendants' Motion nor their Answer sets
forth their subsequently advanced theory that they had not agreed
to the release of the lots.
Thus, in gathering its affidavits
Utah Mortgage was left to guess as to the basis for the Summa~y
Judgment.
Since the only "evidence" filed by defendants consisted
of cert1f ied copies of the Trust Deed and Deed of Reconveyanc~,
plaintiff's counsel was led to believe that defendants contenaed
that any release of the collateral (whether consented to or not)
was ir1Violation of the one-action rule.

-6-
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that "all" of the Black lots were released
release agreement
the pr ,,per ty
26.)

(R.

30)

ccording to the le

and that "the pro.

• were not sufficient to

eds fron, the sah

P<°'i

off the loan."

U;1less one applies a rather unique interpretation to the

wora "all" one must conclude that every single lot contained i:
the Black subdivision was released upon payment by the defendo:
of the prearranged release price.

It follows that defendants'

characterization of the reason given by Utah Mortgage for
releasing the lots is totally inaccurate and misleading.
While it is understandable that def end an ts are not ha,
with the facts as set forth in the affidavits,

for purposes of

their Summary Judgment defendants must live with them.

The

pertinent facts are these:

1.
$675,715.00.
2.

utah Mortgage loaned defendants the sum of
(R.

25.)

To secure payment of the loan, Utah Mortgage took

trust deed on the subdivision which defendants were developing.
(R.

16. J
3.

At or about the time of the execution of the note

trust deed, defendants agreed with Utah Mortgage that upon the.
payment of an agreed price,

Utah Mortgoge would direct the tru'·

to execute partial reconveyances fro m the Trust Deed so that tr
sale of the particulor lot could be completed.

(R.

7 - of Museum and Library Services
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26, 29, JO.

4.

Because of various cost overruns, delays and

unforseen expenses, the amount required to complete the project,
and the corresponding funds dispursed from the loan account
exceeded the fair market value of the lots comprising the
proJect.

(R.

5.

$36,760.01.

6.

26.)

The unpaid principal balance of the loan is

(R. 25.) 2
All of the lots in the subdivision were released

pursuant to the lot release agreement between defendants and Utah
Mortgage.

(R.

30.)
ARGUMENT

POINT I
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF REVEALS THE EXISTENCE OF
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
It is universally acknowledgea that summary judgment is
in appropriate where there exists an unresolved issue at to a
material fact.

Thus, this Court has said:

2 Al though the evidence as to the loan balance is
uncontradicted, defendants make much of the discrepancy between
the prayer of the Complaint ($38,467.43) and Mr. Anderson's
Affidavit ($36.760.01).
(See Brief of Defendants-Respondent at
pp. 1, 3.)
While the discrepancy is irrelevant to these
proceedings, the Court may wish to know that the difference
represents accrued interest on the loan.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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A summary jud9'.1ent must be supported bv evi0ence
admissions anc1 inferences which w},en v·iewed in the
light most favorable to the loser shows that
"there is no genuine issue as to any materiai fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of Jaw."
Such showing must
preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser
could, if given a trial, produce e~idence which
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor.
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11
U.2d 1, 4-5, 354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960).
As alluded to in the Statement Facts in this Brief, there are
significant disputes as to the facts

in this case.

Thus, unde

the rule stated above, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Utah Mortgage's opposition to entry of summary judgme
below is based upon the fact that the release of the collatw·
(the lots in the subdivision) was agreed to by the

defendan~

therefore does not constitute the type of "act or neglect" whi·
will bar it from suing the borrowers directly.

Defendants'

response to this argument is primarilv in the form of an
interpretation of the facts as set forth in the Affidavits of
Messrs. Anderson, Fry and Newman.

Thus, as to Utah Mortgage's

argument that defendants agreed to release of the lots, de~~
respond by asserting that

(1)

outside of the Trust Deed

(Brief of Defendants-Respondent, P·

and

(2)

such an agreement does not exist

Utah Mortgage lost track of the number of lots whi~ i

had released and inadvertently re] eased the remaining lots wif
obtaining consideration.

(.Ii.

at PP. 15, 16, 19.)
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..I

It should be noted at the outset that defendants'
arguments are essentially factual rather than legal.

To

reiterate, the so called "facts" upon which defendants rely are
(1)

that there was no release agreement other than that found in

the Trust Deed and (2)
property.

that Utah Mortgage "lost track" of the

As discussed in the Statement of Facts, at best

defendants' "facts" are disputed by the affidavits; at worst, they
find no support in the Record.

This fact is shown clearly by the

affidavits of Craig D. Anderson (R. 25\, John D. Fry (R. 29), and
Robert A. Newman (R. 30) each of which speaks of an agreement by
which lots in the subdivision were to be released upon payment of
a specific lot release price.

Similarly, Mr. Newman's Affidavit

clearly states that "all of the Black lots were released in this
manner."

(Id.)

There is absolutely nothing in the record to

indicate that the lots were released by virtue of Utah Mortgage's
having "lost track" of the number of lots which had been released
or the amount which had been released from the lot release
program.

It follows that defendants' case for summary judgment is

based upon disputed or nonexistent facts.

Summary Judgment was

therefore inappropriate.
POINT II
THE PROPERTY WAS NOT "LOST" BY VIRTUE OF ANY "ACT
OR NEGLECT" OF UTAH MORTGAGE
The parties are in agreement that the law applicable to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this case is set forth in Donaldson v. Grant, 15
(1897)

u. 231,

49 P,

and Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453,

B.P.O.E., 88 U.

577, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936), wherein it is stated

that where collateral is lost without the fault of the

secu~d

party or where it is not lost because of "act or neglect" of H
secured party, the creditor is not barred by the one-action ru:
from proceeding on the note.
at 583, 56 P.2d at 1049. 3

15 U. at 241, 49 P. at 781; 88 U!

The parties diverge, however, in

their views as to whether or not in directing the trustee to
release the lots Utah Mortgage was free of fault or of neglect.
Defendants take the position that the release of the;
was a voluntary act by Utah Mortgage and that such a voluntary

3Defendants suggest the following formulation for the rule:
[Tlhe mortgagee is relieved from its duty to
proceed by forclosure only if the property is
lost through circumstances beyond its control.
(Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 17.)
This proposed formulation does not appear to. contradict. the ru'
set forth in Donaldson and Cache Valley Bank1n~ except inso~r
the reference to "circumstances beyond its control" may imoly'
higher duty on the part of the creditor than freedom from faul·
negligence.
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by its very nature shows neglect and inadvertence. 4
There are two weaknesses in this agrument -- one factual,
one legal.

First, it is misleading to speak of the partial

releases of the collateral as a "voluntary act".

In point of fact

Utah Mortgage was contractually bound to release the lots upon
request by defendants and receipt of payment of the lot release
price.

Whether performance of a contractual obligation is a

"voluntary act" is simply a semantical game having no relevance to
the issue at hand.
Rather than asking whether plaintiff's performance of its
contractual obligation was "voluntary", this Court should ask
whether Utah Mortgage's actions were free of negligence or fault,
i.e., whether it acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Clearly such a determination is one for the trier of fact and is
inappropriate for summary judgment.
Second, the rule of law is that where collateral has been
released with the consent of the mortgagor, a personal action on

4"If Utah Mortgage lost the security for its loan
before that loan was paid off, it did so
through a voluntary reconveyance of the property,
not through destruction or prior forclosure.
At
best, Utah Mortgage can claim only that its
security was lost through its neglect and
inadvertence. Such a loss can not excus~ a
"
mortgagee from the One-Action Rules requirements.
(Brief of Defendants-Respondent, p. 12.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the note is not barred by the one-action rule.
Company v. State,

32 Cal 194,

]62 P.

647, 648-49

(1916)

(Fora

more complete discussion of this rule, see Brief of Appellant,
6-9.)

But even if one assumes that release of the lots was
"voluntary", and that the lots were released through the "act
neglect" of Utah Mortgage,

it does not follo•,1 that Utah Mortga:

claim against the defendants is barred by the one-action rule.
The underlying supposition of defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment is that the release of the lots constituted a "loss"
within the meaning of

Q~ald~on

and Cache Valley Banking.

Thl

defendants state, "In this case, the security obviously was le
through the act and neglect of Utah Mortgage."
Defendants-Respondent, p. 8.).

(Brief of

But such a theory is inconsis1

with the policy underlying the one-action rule.

The rule was

adopted for the purpose of protecting the debtor from a
multiplicity of suits.

ea.

1970).

G. Osborne, Mortgages, § 334 at 701 L

Since the statute is designed to protect the debt!

it follows that the question of whether the collatera] has be'
"lost" must be approached from the debtor's standpoint.

If t'

collateral has not by the creditor's actions become valueless
the debtor, it cannot be said that he has suffered a "loss' i
would bar the creditor's action on the note.
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Furthermore, in order to bar the creditor's recovery the
alleged negligent action must be the logical cause of the
collateral's having become valueless.

Thus this Court's decision

in Donaldson v. Grant, ~upra., speaks of loss of the collateral
"through no fault of the mortgagee".

88 Utah at 583, 56 P.2d at

104 9.

In the case at bar these elements are not present.

Utah

Mortgage's partial releases did not render the collateral
valueless to defendants.

On the contrary, in releasing its lien

on a particular lot Utah Mortgage bestowed value upon it -- value
which could be immediately realized by defendants by sale of the
lot.
Similarly, it is defendants, not Utah Mortgage, which
have now rendered the property valueless to themselves (and to
Utah Mortgage) by conveying the property to third parties.

It

follows that the acts attributed to Utah Mortgage by defendants
did not result in any loss within the meaning of Donaldson and
Cache Valley Banking.
~

Therefore Utah Mortgage's release of the

collateral does not bar its recovery from defendants.

t'

CONCLUSION
"'

Defendants motion for summary judgment is based upon the
facts which are either disputed or unsupported by the Record.
These include the allegations that no lot release agreement
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existed betwPen the parties and that Utah Mortgage inadverten:
released a portion of the subdivision lots from the Trust Deel
without having obtained adequate consideration for

the releasE.

Since the Record is devoid of any facts which substantiate thE
allegations,
Motion.

the court below erred in granting defendants'

Furthermore, even if the facts were as defendants ha•:•

portrayed them, their Motion should still have been denied sir,:
they have suffered no loss as a result of the !"elease of the
collateral.

It follows that the lower court's decision shoull

reversed and remanded.
DATED this

_ii~~

day of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appel
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-1500

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15 ..

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

-5!!'2._

day of ~~~-~f~~~~-

19so, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply
Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

Ricardo B. Ferrari
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
L. S. McCullough
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111
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